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MEMORY DECREMENT 
Memory Decrement and 
Proactive Interference 
William J. Thornton and Bennett L. 
Schwartz 
Florida International University 
Abstract 
We hypothesized that subjective 
expectations were responsible for the re-
lease from proactive interference (PI) 
rather than the actual change in taxonomic 
subcategories. The experimental condi-
tions included informing or not informing 
subjects of the change in taxonomic sub-
category, crossed with whether the taxo-
nomic subcategory was actually changed 
or remained unchanged. The interest in 
whether a release would be seen when the 
subjects were informed of a change, yet no 
change was actually administered, was 
most specific. Significantly higher recall 
was found for the condition in which 
subjects were informed of a change, but no 
actual change occured (I-NC) than in the 
control condition in which subjects were 
neither informed of a change nor did one 
occure (NI-NC). The overal results 
indicated that control condtions revealed 
lower recall than other conditions, F(3, 
129) = 2.96. p < .05 on the critical trial. 
However, even when subjects were not 
told of a change, but a change occured 
(NI-C) a release from PI was observed, 
M=.69. A release from PI may be induced 
by the subject's self-awareness of the 
change in taxonomic subcategory. 
Russ-Eft (1979) wrote that "proac- 
tive interference (PI) is a phenomenon 
characterized by a decreasing probability of 
recall with an increasing number of to-be-
remembered items" (p. 422). However, 
since the late 1970's, little has been done 
to further understand this concept. 
Nevertheless, we were interested in the 
phenomenon because of the importance it 
plays in diverse applications in society. 
For example, it may be that if the phe-
nomenon of PI is understood better, we 
will be able to utilin. that knowledge when 
developing academic learning curricula,  
industrial training programs, and other 
procedural learning situations. It may be 
possible to make those learning ex-
periences more fruitful by helping learners 
commit more information to long-term 
memory. 
In the PI paradigm, subjects are 
presented with a list of three (sometimes 
more) items that are designated the to-be-
remembered (TBR) items. After a distrac-
tion period subjects are prompted to recall 
these items. The original research varied 
the amount of time the distraction interval 
lasted (Brown, 1958; Peterson & 
Peterson, 1959). They found that the 
longer retention interval resulted in a 
greater memory decrement. 
Brown (1958) postulated that 
memory loss after repeated trials was a re-
sult of decay. The decay theory states that 
information presented to the memory sys-
tem starts to deteriorate immediately and 
automatically from short-term memory. 
He found a decrement in memory perfor-
mance, as a function of time (Brown's 
finding was used to validate the decay the-
ory). He presumed that because memory 
performance decreased as the retention in-
terval increased, it must be the increased 
length of time that is responsible for poor 
memory performance. 
However, Keppel and Underwood 
(1962) found that by maintaining a con-
stant retention interval, there was still a 
decrement of memory from the first to the 
later trials when utilizing the same type of 
distractor task as Peterson and Peterson 
(Wickens, 1970). This finding led Keppel 
and Underwood to suggest that there was 
another process other than decay contribut-
ing to the loss of memory. They intro-
duced a theory of memory loss being "at-
tributable to PI [Proactive Interference] 
from previous items" (Baddeley, 1966, p. 
302). 
Wickens (1970) was interested in 
determining what mechanism might com-
pensate for the effect of PL He began an 
intensive study of the release from PI phe-
nomenon. In Wickens' research, four 
trials were conducted in one category 
(e.g., fish). The study items were then 
changed to another category (e.g., tools) 
on the critical trial. He found that on this 
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on the critical trial. He found that on this 
crucial trial, when the category was 
changed, the subjects showed improved 
memory for the new category items. 
Thus, after having been given four 
consecutive trials of four words in each 
trial, the subjects have learned a total of 
16 items from the same category (e.g., 
fish). If asked to recall the last group of 
four fish names, the subjects will have the 
previous 12 names of fish interfering with 
his or her memory. However, on the 
fourth trial, if the category was shifted to 
tools the subjects would have only four 
tools to remember, with no prior tools 
impeding upon the memory of those four. 
Thus, release from PI allows memory 
performance to improve. 
Gardiner, Craik, and Birtwhistle 
(1972) referred to the 1970 study by 
Wickens in which summarized several 
prior studies which demonstrated that 
"rapid accumulation of PI depended upon 
similarity, across trials, of the TBR [to-
be-remembered] items and further that 
performance could be restored almost to 
the original level if, on the next trial the 
TBR items were drawn from a different 
class" (p. 778). However, despite the 
general agreement as to the value of the 
release from PI effect when studying 
encoding, there is still no clear 
determination of the underlying causes. 
Gardiner et al. (1972) summarized 
three basic hypotheses that could account 
for the release from PI. The first explana-
tion is Wickens' (1970) attentional 
hypothesis which states that the subjects 
are alerted by the change in the TBR ma-
terial on the critical trial and consequently 
gives more attention to the new materiaL 
The second possibility described by 
Gardiner et al., is Posner's storage 
hypothesis which suggests that "PI 
reflects spontaneous interaction during 
storage between the traces of current 
items and those of similar items stored 
from preceding trials. By this view the 
'release' items are less vulnerable to inter-
trial interference" (p. 778-779). The third 
interpretation offered by Gardiner et al. 
was the retrieval hypothesis, attributed to 
Wickens. In this hypothesis, once "the 
TBR material is changed, the novel items  
supply a new, and thus more effective re-
trieval cue" (p. 779). 
Wicken's research demonstrates 
that switching to a new category allows 
memory performance to increase to first 
trial levels. However, it is not clear from 
his work as to what defines a category. In 
fact, Gardiner et al. (1972) found no re-
lease when subjects were not informed 
about a subtle category shift (e.g. garden 
flowers to wild flowers). It may not be 
that categories, per se, are responsible for 
the release phenomenon. Rather, subject's 
subjective expectations may play a key 
role in the release phenomenon. As such, 
we suspected that subjective expectations 
alone may lead to the release from PI. To 
test this, we lead people to believe a 
category-shift had occurred when, in fact, 
no shift actually occurred (O'Neill, 
Sutcliffe & Tulving, 1976). 
Our hypothesis was in partial 
agreement with each of the three hypothe-
ses summarized by Gardiner et al. (1972). 
As with the attentional hypothesis, we too 
suspected that the subjects would be 
alerted by the change in category. This 
would allow the subjects to give more 
attention to the new material because the 
prior material is not going to be requested 
at recall. However, we suspected that the 
same effect would occur if the subjects 
thought that the category had changed 
even when the category remained 
constant. As to the storage hypothesis, we 
anticipated that the release items were less 
vulnerable to intertrial interference. 
However, it was our suggestion that this 
was a result of the subject's subjective 
expectation that information from the 
prior category would not be required at 
test, rather than the fact that it would not. 
As to Wickens' retrieval hypothesis, we 
proposed that it was the belief of category 
change that supplied the new, and thus 
more effective retrieval cue, rather than 
the change itself. 
We suspected that the mechanism 
responsible for the release from PI was 
not the actual change in categories, but 
rather it was the subjective expectation 
that allows people to reorganize memory 
output, and thus permits release whether 
or not the category had actually changed. 
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Our purpose was to show that when the 
subjects believed there had been a change 
in the category from which the words 
were drawn, subjects would automatically 
purge the preceding, interfering material 
out of memory. Hence, subjects would 
experience a release from proactive 
interference. This clean memory register 
would then enable the memory system to 
encode and recall with efficiency 
equivalent to that experienced on the first 
trial. According to the subjective 
organization hypothesis, we suspected 
that the pattern of release would be as fol-
lows: I-C (Informed with change) = high 
release; NI-C (Not informed, but change) 
= low release; I-NC (Informed but not 
change) = high release; NI-NC (Not 
informed, no change) = low release. 
It was the primary purpose of this 
experiment to demonstrate that an effect 
would be found in the subjective expecta-
tion of subjects. We thought the mecha-
nism which controls release from PI is the 
subjective expectation of a category 
change on the critical trial, rather than the 
actual change. 
Recognizing that the three 
hypotheses summarized by Gardiner et al. 
(1972) are not mutually exclusive of one 
another, our hypothesis does not distin-
guish between each of the three. Rather, 
our hypothesis offers an encompassing 
explanation of the higher processing 
involved in the proactive interference phe-
nomenon, which the three hypotheses 
summarized by Gardiner et al. may be 
subordinate to. 
Method 
Overview 
All subjects were tested in the 
Cognitive Psychology Lab at Florida 
International Univeristy. A personal com-
puter was utilized to conduct all of the 
testing. A program designed specifically 
for testing the proactive interference phe-
nomenon was employed to ensure consis-
tent time intervals and random word 
selection for all of the subjects. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 143 Florida 
International University undergraduate 
students from various psychology classes. 
Participation in the experiment was 
offered as an extra credit project, or in 
some cases, as part of the class 
curriculum. Each subject was tested 
individually. There were young adult 
students in addition to older adult 
students. Age group was not analyzed. 
Materials 
We generated a list of word triads. These 
word groups were all taken from subcate-
gories (e.g., indoor sports) of the larger 
classes (e.g., sports). Subjects were 
shown a triad of words on a computer 
screen. These words were grouped by 
subcategory. There were a total of 16 
subcategories belonging to eight larger 
categories. Each word was presented for 
a two-second interval. After presentation 
of the words, the subjects engaged in an 
active distractor task of counting 
backwards, out loud, by threes, from a 
given three digit number. Immediately 
prior to encoding the final triad of words 
(this is also known as the critical trial) 
subjects were either given a blank screen 
if they were in the not informed condition, 
or a message identifying the subcategory 
to which the upcoming words belonged, 
such as "New Category= Saltwater Fish". 
The designation of the new category may 
have been an accurate depiction, or in 
some cases, intentional misinformation 
given by the experimenter such as "New 
Category = Fresh Water Fish", when in 
fact the category remained Salt Water 
Fish as in the previous trials. 
Design 
The study used a 4 X 2 between-
subjects design with one factor being 
whether or not subjects were informed of 
a subcategory change and whether or not 
a change actually occurred. This variable 
was crossed with the presentation of 
either three or four trials prior to the 
critical trial. 
Procedure 
Upon entering the lab, each 
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subject was seated in front of the com-
puter terminal. A list of instructions, 
which gave computer operating directions 
and task details, was read aloud by the 
examiner. The instructions were identical 
for all of the subjects. Once the 
experiment began, the subjects were 
presented with the first group of three 
words to remember. After presentation of 
the third word, subjects engaged in the 
distraction task. Upon completion of the 
distractor task, the subjects were asked to 
recall the target words by typing them on 
the computer. Order of recall was not 
important. The subjects were then pre-
sented with the next word triad. This 
continued until the final critical trial. 
In the final trial, the critical ma-
nipulation occurred. Some subjects were 
informed of a sub-category shift and 
others were not. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to the informed or not informed 
conditions in addition to being randomly 
assigned to the change or no change 
conditions. 
Informed Conditions 
For those subjects who were in-
formed of a sub-category change, a 
change may have occurred (I-C), or they 
may have been misinformed of a change 
when no change actually occurred (I-NC). 
For half of the informed subjects, this 
shift actually occurred. 
Change vs. No Change Condition 
The two separate conditions that 
involved change of the subcategory were 
the change and no change conditions. In 
the change condition, a subcategory 
different than that in the prior trials was 
actually introduced. The subjects may 
have been previously informed of the 
change (I-C), or not informed of any 
change (NI-C). However, in the no 
change condition, the subcategory 
remained the same as the prior trial even 
when informed that a change was about to 
occur (I-NC). 
A control condition was also run 
in which subjects were not informed of 
any subcategory information on the 
critical trial, nor was there any change in  
the subcategory (NI-NC). These four 
conditions (I-C, I-NC, NI-C, NI-NC) were 
crossed with the possibility of receiving 
either three of four word triads prior to the 
critical trial. This yielded a total of eight 
experimental conditions. We then com-
pared the amount of release as a function 
of a subcategory shift and subject's 
awareness of this shift. 
Results 
We found significantly higher 
recall for the condition in which subjects 
were informed of a change, but no actual 
change occurred (I-NC, M = .63) than in 
the control condition (NI-NC, M = .49), 
t(143) = 1.8, p < .05, one-tailed. Overall, 
we found that the control condition 
showed lower recall than the other 
conditions, F (3,143) = 2.96, p < .05 on 
the critical trial. However, even when 
subjects were not told of a change, but a 
change occurred, we observed a release 
from PI (M = .69). Thus, we did not 
replicate the Gardiner, et al. findings. 
Additionally, we found no difference be-
tween the presentation of three trials and 
four trials prior to the critical trial. 
Discussion 
The release from PI may be in-
duced by the subject's awareness of the 
change in taxonomic subcategory. This 
awareness may occur either by having 
been made aware of a change in 
subcategory by the experimenter or by 
noticing it themselves. In each of the 
three conditions in which the subjects be-
came aware of a change (or supposed 
change) the subjects were expecting 
different upcoming information and 
perhaps purged the prior interfering 
material from short-term memory. 
What seems to be most interesting 
is that misinforming the subjects actually 
resulted in an increase in memory perfor-
mance. It seems that this misinformation 
serves as a stimulus for the subject's mem- 
ory system to unconsciously clear the 
memory store of all prior information. As 
such, the memory register is then ready to 
accept at full capacity/efficiency the 
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upcoming information which will not be 
impeded by the previous, now purged 
information. According to our results, it 
must be that the memory system looks for 
opportunities to clear its bank of prior 
information to enable processing of any 
upcoming information in the most 
efficient manner possible. 
Further research in the applied 
field should be able to test this idea. For 
example, it may be that by presenting 
short segments of information in learning 
environments such as school, then 
changing to a new topic or to a different 
sub-topic within the same overall topic, 
students may be able to recall the infor-
mation better. With clearer recall of the 
material, storage in long-term memory 
may be enhanced. 
In summary, self-awareness alone, 
appears to be sufficient to induce a 
release. When subjects are made aware of 
a potential change, their recall 
performance improves even when they 
have been misled by the experimenter. 
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